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Since beginning in1852, few issues in higher education have captivated Americans as much as inter-
collegiate athletics.  Intercollegiate athletics is almost uniquely American. Each year, millions of fans 
attend games and matches between student athletes who provide fans with entertainment while help-
ing bind together communities. Proponents of college athletics point to other benefits such as en-
hancing a school’s visibility on a national level and providing opportunities for athletes to develop 
leadership, teamwork and other traits that add to human capital upon graduation 
Despite some benefits, intercollegiate athletics has many critics as well. Some critics argue that 
coaches and sports administrators denigrate academics and overemphasize the importance of sports. 
Others claim that athletes in the big-revenue sports of men’s basketball and football are exploited by 
the university. Others feel that intercollegiate athletics create a culture on college campuses that 
downplays the importance of gaining knowledge. The debates about intercollegiate athletics have 
been growing for over a century and seem to be exacerbated by an inability to fully quantify its costs 
and benefits. 
An interesting aspect of intercollegiate athletics is the diversity of participation among higher educa-
tion institutions. According to Weisbrod, Ballou, and Asch, in 2006, there were 2.9 million under-
graduate students enrolled at Division I Football Bowl Subdivision schools while there are 11.3 mil-
lion at all schools offering a bachelor’s degree.1 Put differently, almost 75 percent of undergraduate 
students do not attend an institution that competes prominently on a national level. For-profit insti-
tutions do not compete in athletics, and liberal arts and community colleges engage in athletics only 
to a very limited extent.  
The main focus of this study will be the 119 Division I Football Bowl Subdivision schools. The Divi-
sion I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) is the most scrutinized and regulated division of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).  Regulations are imposed on these schools in a variety of ar-
eas, including the number of varsity sports, football attendance mandates, scheduling requirements, 
and financial-aid minimums to name a few.2 The other subdivisions in Division I are the Football 
Championship Subdivision (FCS) and the non-football subdivision; both encapsulate smaller schools 
and provide athletics on smaller scales. 
This analysis focuses on several key issues in the FBS. The intrinsic benefits of athletic programs are 
discussed in the first section. Trends in graduation rates and academic performance among athletes 
and how they correlate with the general student body are discussed in the second section. Finally, an 
overview of the revenues and expenses of athletic department budgets are discussed in an effort to 
gain a better understanding of the allocation of funds to athletics. In spite of recent growth in reve-
nues and expenses, the athletic department budget comprises on average only 5 percent of the entire 
university budget at an FBS school, though spending and revenues have increased dramatically in 
recent years. In the grand scheme of things, American higher education faces several other, arguably 
more pressing, areas of reform. However, athletics is a significant and growing dimension of higher 
education that warrants in-depth examination. 
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We utilize a variety of sources ranging from journal articles to documents published by the NCAA to 
substantiate key facts and findings. The NCAA keeps detailed statistics regarding institutional and 
team graduation rates and revenues and expenses of each member school by distributing surveys to 
member institutions.3 Published statistics give an idea about the overall state of NCAA revenues and 
expenses, though individual school data is not currently available due to confidentiality issues. This 
study largely uses the statistics compiled by Daniel Fulks for the period of 2004-06 to draw conclu-
sions about the revenues and expenses at FBS schools. Various other sources are used to supple-
ment the NCAA data. 
Though a good number of critics are animated in their views of intercollegiate athletics, it is clear that 
there are at least some benefits as well as costs to the institution, participants, and society as a 
whole. Part I will explore some of these in greater detail. 
Part I: Benefits of Intercollegiate Athletics 
Intercollegiate athletics is important to institutions for many reasons. Assuming that university ad-
ministrators are rational in their decision making, it would be illogical for them to continue to sup-
port athletics if they did not perceive at least some benefit.  Beyond benefitting individual collegiate 
athletes themselves, a case can be made that athletics provides benefits to schools and even society 
as a whole. Intercollegiate athletics benefits the institution, society, and the participants as well. 
Benefits to the Institution 
A successful athletic program can benefit the broader institution in a number of ways.  First, athlet-
ics can help institutions gain national exposure. As Tim Weiser, former athletic director at Kansas 
State remarked in 2001,  
“Athletics can be thought of as the front porch of a house.  People will often see the university 
through the athletic program in a way that they might not otherwise see the university. . . .[I]f you 
drive by a house and you see a front porch that is not well-kept, with shingles falling off, you are 
likely to draw the conclusion that the rest of the house must also be in bad shape.  Conversely, if you 
have a well-kept front porch, the rest of the university will take on the same image.  So when it is 
done right, athletics give people all across the country the chance to draw very positive conclusions 
about the rest of the University.”4 
Weiser correctly notes the potential costs and risks associated with portraying a negative image of the 
university through athletics as well. Regardless, many argue that increased positive athletic exposure 
can benefit the school in things such as future enrollments.  After playing in the 1996 Rose Bowl, 
applications at Northwestern University for the next year’s incoming class of freshmen rose by 30 
percent.5 This allowed for greater selectivity, and average SAT scores of that class rose by nearly 20 
points.6 Subsequently, the school rose four places—from thirteenth to ninth—in U.S. News and World 
Report (hereafter USNWR) ranking of colleges.7 Athletics may help augment applications where a stu-
dent who cannot decide between two universities may decide on the fact that he or she will have the 
opportunity to attend major Division I sporting events at one school, but not at the other. 
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Athletic success can help build school solidarity among the entire university community. Since televi-
sion broadcasts reach a huge audience, athletics can help to connect alumni back to their alma-
mater. Broadcasts even show overhead views of the university that allow alumni to see changes in 
the campus and/or reminisce about their time at the university. Many believe the increased loyalty 
leads to higher alumni donations.8 Higher donations earn institutions a higher rating in prominent 
college rankings such as the USNWR.9 A higher institutional rating is likely to yield more applicants 
in future years as well as the perks of being a more prestigious university. At least this is what propo-
nents of large athletic subsidies argue. 
Benefits to Society 
Intercollegiate athletics entertain millions of viewers every year. It is apparent that Americans highly 
value watching college football, as ESPN is televising the five BCS Championship Football Games for 
$500 million over four years.10 On November 18, 1999, the NCAA and CBS agreed to a new 11-year 
agreement for the NCAA Basketball Championship Tournament, commencing with the 2003 champi-
onship.11 The agreement, for a minimum of $6 billion, includes rights to television (over-the-air, ca-
ble, satellite, digital and home video), marketing, game programs, radio, Internet, fan festivals and 
licensing (excluding concessionaire agreements). Without a doubt, many enjoy watching intercolle-
giate athletics. 
Yiannakis, Douvis, and Murdy studied some of the non-economic impacts of sports.12 Their findings 
measured sports’ impact on 702 Connecticut residents (non-athletes) in terms of job creation, infra-
structure, image promotion, economic impacts, environmental impacts, crime, as well as other areas. 
The authors found that conflicts, issues, ideologies, pain, success, and tragedy are all blended in 
sports. People identify with these and are able to better handle the challenges of life as they see 
teams fighting on the field of play. 
Benefits to Participants 
In some respects, student athletes benefit greatly from being involved in intercollegiate athletics. 
Most obviously, athletics provides scholarships to gifted athletes, allowing even some of America’s 
most disadvantaged youth an opportunity to obtain a college degree. Athletes develop leadership 
traits, a competitive spirit, and the importance of teamwork, cooperation and time-management.  
There is some evidence to support this.  In a 2005 survey of student athletes at 18 FBS institutions, 
82.2 responded either “very much” or “quite a bit” when posed the question: “To what extent, if any, 
has your athletics participation added to your educational and/or personal development?”13 Addition-
ally, 98 percent responded that athletics positively influenced their leadership skills, 98 percent to 
teamwork, 97 percent to work ethic, and 94 percent said athletics positively influenced their time-
management skills.14  
Furthermore, it is argued that athletics can help to develop character, though the differences in the 
definition of athletes’ perception of character can have positive and negative impacts on society.15 
Rudd and Mondello argue that athletes and athletic administrators view character from a social per-
spective, emphasizing traits such as self sacrifice, teamwork, perseverance, and work ethic while 
most of society views character from a moral standpoint.16  
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The Rudd and Mondello study hypothesizes that college head coaches tend to focus more on the so-
cial dimensions of character rather than the moral aspects. Moral aspects of character define traits 
such as honesty, fairness, responsibility, and respect. Putting emphasis on the social aspects of char-
acter as opposed to the moral aspects can give athletes a misguided approach to character. Arguably 
this has led to more penalties for celebrations in football and a subsequent crackdown by the NCAA 
on unsportsmanlike conduct.17  
Another argument made by Rudd and Mondello is the contradiction that can occur between social 
and moral views of character.18 An example would be a coach’s request of a baseball player to “lean 
into a pitch” in an attempt to reach first base for being hit by the pitch. On the one hand, an explicit 
rule of the game has not been broken and a player is self-sacrificing for the betterment of the team. 
This meets the social view of character. On the other hand, this act does not meet the moral traits of 
honesty, responsibility, and respect. It should be noted that instances such as the one above can be 
found in any sport and the more times an athlete is faced with such a dilemma, the easier it becomes 
to choose the social rather than the moral view.19 
Intercollegiate athletes must fulfill more obligations outside of the classroom than the average stu-
dent. Student athletes must learn how to manage their time to meet the academic standards of the 
university as well as the time commitment associated with excelling on the athletic field. According to 
Cigliano, student athletes claimed the following virtuous character traits were gained by being a stu-
dent athlete: recognition, patience, time management, self-discipline, maturity, motivation, self confi-
dence, perseverance, leadership, and teamwork.20 Athletes have an easier time developing relation-
ships and establishing rapport with teammates because they relate to each other on many levels. The 
increased kinship among team members may attract higher retention and ultimately graduation rates 
among athletes.  
Wage Differentials 
Along with the benefits discussed above, some evidence suggests that athletes make more money 
upon graduation than non-athletes. Daniel Henderson et al. show that some collegiate athletes earn 
wages higher than others, though the margin is slim, and, “Less than half the college athletes actu-
ally receive a positive gain.”21 The study suggests that athletes earn more in the fields of business, 
military, and manual labor, but they are also more likely to become relatively low paid high school 
teachers.22  Long and Caudill in 1991 suggested that male athletes earn four percent higher wages 
early in their labor market careers, when aged 28 to 30.23 They attribute these findings to the fact 
that athletes gain skills that are valuable in the labor force, such as discipline, confidence, motivation 
and a competitive spirit.24 Though there may still be validity to the Long and Caudill study, the data 
concerning wage differentials was compiled during the 1970s. 
The Center for College Affordability and Productivity used regression analysis in attempting to explain 
institutional-level variation of the starting salaries of graduates, as reported by the website Pay-
scale.com. The results suggest that successful athletic schools, other things equal, have graduates 
with higher earnings, regardless of whether they were athletes or not, suggesting there might be some 
positive earnings spillover effects from athletes to non-athletes.. CCAP’s Daniel Bennett25 developed a 
statistical model using the starting salary of 298 schools as the dependent variable, which was then 
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regressed against institutional characteristics, such as geographic location, school size and type, 
various demographics and social characteristics, selectivity, graduation rates, endowment size, net 
tuition and athletic success. Director’s cup score was used as a proxy for athletic success and was 
found to have a moderately significant positive correlation with starting salary, indicating a positive 
benefit for all students of a college with a successful athletics programs. Please note that this analy-
sis does not attempt to explain causation. The regression results are included in this study’s appen-
dix. 
Part II - Graduation Rates and Academic Success 
College athletes are often criticized for poor academic performance and failure to graduate. An image 
of the “dumb jock” often is associated with college athletes—and especially with athletes in the major 
sports of football and basketball. A closer look at the data suggests this is not always the case. How-
ever, this issue is complicated. Graduation rates often cited for NCAA Division I athletes are calcu-
lated in a different manner than for the general student body. The difference came about because 
university presidents wanted a graduation rate that better reflected the mobility among college ath-
letes.26 The Graduation Success Rate (GSR) is the term used to measure graduation rates for Division 
I athletes. 
GSR vs. Federal Graduation Rate 
The GSR rate differs from the Federal Graduation Rate (FGR) in that schools are not penalized for 
athletes who leave the school in good academic standing. According to GSR proponents, athletes 
transfer at a higher rate than the school’s general student body, which justifies using the GSR as op-
posed to the FGR. The GSR captures 37 percent more student athletes than the federal rate, thus 
making it a more accurate reflection of athletes’ academic success.27 However, a possible shortcoming 
of GSR is that it does not follow transfers all the way to graduation. Rather, as long as they are in 
good academic standing upon transferring (i.e. eligible to compete in the next academic term), they 
are excluded from the denominator when calculating athlete graduation rates for a school. This prob-
lem is likely alleviated to a certain extent in that athletes transferring into a school are then counted 
in that schools denominator. However, the GSR does not consider athletes leaving early to compete 
professionally. When using the GSR for student athletes and the FGR for regular students, it appears 
that athletes actually graduate at far higher rates, 77 percent compared with 62 percent. However, to 
some extent this is like comparing apples with oranges. 
 When the FGR is applied to student athletes, the rate is remarkably similar to the general student 
body. The 2000-2001 freshman cohorts yielded a 62 percent graduation rate for all students and a 
63 percent rate for student athletes (see table 1).28 
According to an article released by NCAA News on October 14, 2008, “Student-athletes continue to 
perform well in the classroom, graduating at a higher rate than ever before and continuing to surpass 
the graduation rates achieved by the general student body.”29 The article notes that graduation rates 
have continued to rise since the implementation of GSR rates as opposed to the FGR. But is the GSR 
a legitimate measure? 
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The argument is made that athletes transfer at a higher rate than students generally, but there is no 
conclusive data to verify the claim. Since the NCAA began calculating student athlete graduation 
rates using the GSR, rates have seen enormous growth, likely partially attributed to the different 
methodology employed under the GSR. Identifying and creating a more accurate system for calculat-
ing graduation rates is an area of necessary reform for all of higher education. The current FGR is 
less than ideal because it ignores the very real problem of transfer students. The GSR attempts to 
control for this issue; however, a good case can be made that it is not perfect in capturing actual 
graduation rates either. 
Recent research by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution on SAT scores of entering athletes at universities 
in the major BCS conferences is very revealing. Their study shows that athletes on average have 
lower scores compared with the general student body. Nationwide, athletes averaged 124 points lower 
on the SAT than other students (1037 compared with 1161).30 The data are worse for football and 
men’s basketball players with football players scoring 220 points, and basketball players 227 points 
below the national average for all students.31 These are extremely large differences. This suggests that 
on average athletes enter college far less prepared for academic success compared to other students.  
Academic Progress Rate 
The success in recent years of higher graduation rates by sport can be attributed to new NCAA aca-
demic progress reform policies. NCAA President Myles Brand led the trend towards academic reform 
by mandating each of 6,272 Division I sports teams meet requirements to maintain eligibility.32 In 
May 2008, the NCAA said that only 218 teams at 123 institutions will be sanctioned for violations 
while 712 teams were rewarded for being in the top 10 percent of their respective sport. 
The academic progress rate (APR) is measured on a scale of 1,000 based on variables associated with 
academic performance. The APR provides a snapshot of each team based on eligibility, graduation 
rate, retention rate, and progress towards a degree. Under this measure, athletes must complete 40 
percent of a degree by the end of their second year, 60 percent by the end of their third year, and 80 
percent by the end of their fourth year. Athletes must also be enrolled in at least six semester hours 
to be eligible. Schools that earn an APR of less than 900 (equivalent to a GSR of 50 percent) are pun-
ished by the NCAA in the following ways.33 
• First year sanction is a public warning letter for poor performance 
• Second year sanctions include restrictions on scholarships, recruiting, and practice time 
Freshman Cohort Graduation Rates All Students Student Athletes 
2000-2001 Graduation Rate 62% 63% 
Four Class Average 61% 62% 
Student Athlete GSR N/A 77% 
Table 1: Graduation Rates for the General Student Body and Student Athletes 
Source: Official NCAA Website 
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• Third year sanctions result in loss of postseason competition for the team 
• Four consecutive years of poor academic performance results in restricted membership status for 
an institution 
In addition to this, schools can lose up to 10 percent of their athletic scholarships if they score less 
than 925 and have athletes leave the school for academic reasons. Schools are rewarded if former 
student athletes return to school and obtain a degree, even if it is 10 years after participation.34  
While implementation of programs like the APR enhances graduation rates, there are unintended 
consequences. 
A possible unintended consequence of the APR is the appearance of student athletes ‘clustering’ to-
gether in easy majors. There is evidence that athletes in some schools in many cases are clustering in 
the same majors. In their research, USA Today found 235 clusters (defined as 25 percent of team 
members for larger teams and 33 percent for smaller teams). Of these 235, one third included at least 
half—i.e. 50 percent—of team members.35 While clustering is not necessarily a bad thing, it becomes 
so if athletes are simply taking an easy major to comply with the strict rules enforcing the completion 
of a major within 5 years.36 Rather than studying a subject that interests them, or will be most bene-
ficial to them in the future, they are choosing—or being directed to—a major to simply maintain eligi-
bility. In this scenario, academics are taking a back-seat to athletics, violating generally held univer-
sity missions and priorities. It is unclear whether this clustering phenomenon existed before the 
NCAA implemented the APR. Further research is warranted. 
Table 2 illustrates the clustering of majors among football players and majors as previously reported 
by USA Today.  
At Auburn, less than 1 percent of all undergraduate students major in sociology while 26.3 percent of 
the football team chose sociology. At North Carolina State the same trend is occurring as less than 1 
percent of the undergraduate student body majors in sports management as opposed to 33.3 percent 
of the football team. While perhaps athletes have an aptitude and passion for certain areas of study, 
the varying majors exhibiting “clustering” tendencies across different institutions suggests this is not 
a wholly convincing explanation.  
Accordingly, student athletes are sometimes faced with the difficult decision of choosing between 
sports or a more challenging major because of the time commitments associated with both choices. 
Although a student athlete does make his or her own decision regarding a major, the prospect of los-
ing a full athletic scholarship to pursue a more challenging degree poses a difficult choice. The rising 
cost of obtaining a college degree does not make the decision any easier.  
A result of student athletes clustering in easy majors is higher graduation rates, which is a goal of 
the NCAA. Unfortunately, higher graduation rates come with certain unintended consequences. 
Though graduation rates have increased in the past few years because of the addition of the GSR 
measure as well as reform actions such as the APR, there is still much deviation by gender and sport. 
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GSR Rates for Athletes 
There is great disparity in GSR rates by gender and sport. Table 3 shows the overall average GSRs for 
Division I student athletes, cohorts 1997-2000 and 1998-2001.  
The first observation is the disparity in graduation rates between male and female athletes. As is dis-
cussed earlier, male sports dominate university athletic budgets. Yet .female athletes graduated at a 
16 percent higher rate than male athletes in 1998-2001. The proportion of allocated funds to male 
against female sports programs correlates negatively with graduation rates. 




Auburn Sociology 10 of 38 (26.3%) 62 of 19,603 (0.3%) 
Duke Sociology 14 of 43 (32.6%) 123 of 3,821 (3.2%) 
Harvard Economics 35 of 75 (46.7%) 666 of 5,019 
(13.3%) 
NC State Sports Management 11 of 33 (33.3%) 176 of 22,971 
(0.8%) 
Michigan Sports Management 11 of 50 (22%) 248 of 24,517 (1%) 
Southern Missis-
sippi 
Sports Administration 29 of 66 (43.9%) 843 of 14,058 (6%) 
Virginia Tech Residential Property Management 10 of 54 (18.5%) 75 of 19,218 (0.4%) 
Wake Forest Communication 23 of 52 (44.2%) 241 of 2,000 
(12.1%) 
Table 2: Percentage of Football Players & All Undergraduates Pursuing Certain 
Majors, 2002-03 
Source: USA Today37 
 Category 1997-2000 Cohorts 1998-2001 Cohorts   
 Division 1 Overall 77% 78%   
 Division 1 Men 70% 71%   
 Division 1 Women 87% 87%   
 Division 1 FBS 78% 79%   
 Division 1 FCS 75% 75%   
 Division 1 No Football 79% 81%   
Table 3: Average GSR for Division I Student Athletes, 1997-2000 & 1998-2001 
Source: Official NCAA Website 
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Examining GSRs by sport shows even more dispersion for both genders. As is evident from figures 1 
and 2, females have a higher average GSR than males; 88 percent in 2001 compared with 73 percent 
for males.  
Figure 1:GSR for Selected Men’s Sports, 1995-2001:  Entering Year Cohort 
Source: NCAA Official Website 
Figure 2: GSR for Selected Women’s Sports, 1995-2001: Entering Year Cohorts 
Source: NCAA Official Website 
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There is much greater deviation between sports in male athletics. Basketball, football, and cross 
country/track, which generate the most revenue (save cross country/track), are below the average 
GSR for male athletes. Male GSR rates range from a low of 55 percent in 1995 for basketball to 100 
percent in 1995 for fencing athletes. Fencing, lacrosse, and swimming fare exceptionally well in terms 
of GSR, although they do not generate much revenue. The lower GSR sports of basketball and foot-
ball have made progress in raising GSR rates closer to the average in recent years. 
As far as women’s sports are concerned, there is much less disparity between the average GSR and 
the sport by sport comparisons. Again it is interesting to note that basketball, the sport that gener-
ates the most revenue among women’s sports, has the lowest GSR. Consistent with men’s sports, 
fencing, lacrosse, and swimming also have the highest GSRs for women.  
There has long been a debate of why athletic departments subsidize small sports that do not return 
revenue. Among many possible reasons, these sports help achieve higher aggregate GSR rates. It is 
possible that regardless of NCAA rules regarding minimum team levels, schools may voluntarily 
choose to support such teams as they help boost the athletic department’s overall GSR.  
The average FBS school had 560 student athletes in 2006, according to data from the Equity in Ath-
letics database published by the US Department of Education.39 The more telling statistic is the 
range, which goes from 251 athletes at Tulane University to 988 athletes at The University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison. A school that cross subsidizes its poor performing GSR sports (football, men’s basket-
ball) with sports that achieve higher GSRs (swimming, fencing, lacrosse) reaches higher aggregate 
levels. Wisconsin-Madison offers 19 varsity sports,40 which helps it achieve a higher average GSR 
than smaller schools where football and basketball make up a higher percentage of the student ath-
lete population.41 Though the overall GSR was a respectable 79 percent for Wisconsin-Madison, table 
Men's Sport GSR Women's Sport GSR 
Swimming 89% Tennis 100% 
Basketball 86% Ice Hockey 96% 
Cross Country/Track 83% Swimming 94% 
Wrestling  79% Cross Country/Track 91% 
Tennis 75% Volleyball 91% 
Ice Hockey 72% Crew/Rowing 84% 
Soccer  71% Basketball 80% 
Football 63% Softball 82% 
Golf 50% Soccer 81% 
  Golf 75% 
Table 4: GSR, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998-2001 Cohorts 
Source: NCAA Official Website 
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4 shows the dispersion in GSRs among sports. Football had the second lowest GSR for all sports at 
the university but was “subsidized” by the high GSR rates of men’s and women’s swim teams, 
women’s cross country/track teams, women’s ice hockey team, and women’s volleyball teams. 
Tulane University had an aggregate GSR rate of 80 percent. Perhaps the most interesting thing about 
Tulane is that 106 of its 251 student athletes (42 percent) are football players compared with Wiscon-
sin-Madison’s 120 out of 988 (12 percent).42 In this case the typically lower GSR score for football 
players has a larger impact on the school’s overall score at Tulane than at Wisconsin-Madison.  
The GSR fails to account for vast deviations between sports and also fails to capture the difference in 
school size. The fact that a large school can manipulate its aggregate GSR by offering more sports 
with higher GSR averages gives incentive to do so, which is the trend today.  Tulane plans to expand 
its athletics to include men’s tennis and both men’s and women’s swimming teams in 2009-10. The 
school also plans to add women’s bowling and women’s soccer in 2010-2011.43 Historical figures sug-
gest that aggregate GSR will increase considerably in future years, though minimal revenue will be 
added to the athletic department. Indeed, these smaller sports almost always have negative generated 
revenue, meaning they are a cost item to the athletics department.  
Tulane’s athletic budget in 2006 was a modest $19,168,000 (well below the average FBS school). Ac-
cording to data from the NCAA regarding revenues and expenses, the operating costs associated with 
the sports Tulane proposes adding are as follows: 
It should be noted that these operating costs are for the median program in the NCAA FBS sub-
division. Also, these are annual expenses for the athletic department and do not include any capital 
costs that may need to be invested to build or upgrade current facilities.  
The addition of these sports will raise the aggregate GSR of Tulane considerably if historical trends 
hold in the future, but at what cost? The operating expenses alone will account for a rise of 11.4 per-
cent in the athletic budget. Tulane is almost certainly not one of the 19 NCAA schools that earn reve-
nue in excess of expenses, though the NCAA does not disclose this information for specific institu-
tions. An athletic program that is already losing money will add 11.4 percent to its budget; almost 
Proposed Addition of Tulane University Athletics Program     
Men's Tennis $368,300  
   
Men's Swimming $546,300 
   
Women's Swimming $620,300  
   
Women's Soccer $654,800  
   
Total $2,189,700  
   
Table 5: Median Operating Costs for Various Sports 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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certainly, a privately run business would not do that. Since these sports traditionally do not cover 
expenses, this increased spending will require further subsidization from outside the athletics depart-
ment. An increase of 11.4 percent is especially high when considering the low number of student ath-
letes that will benefit from the additional costs of adding these programs.  
According to the U.S. Department of Education, 3.2 percent of college students participate in inter-
collegiate athletics in the FBS.44 On top of that fact, if approximately 100 student athletes are 
brought in to compete on the new teams, the annual cost per athlete would be $21,897.45  
Summary 
The switch from FGR to the GSR raised graduation rates for student athletes relative to the student 
body. Data about transfer students is trivial at best today as the FGR does not take into account 
transfers from one university to another. For example, if a student transfers from University A to Uni-
versity B, he or she is counted as a dropout from University A and gets lost in the shuffle at Univer-
sity B. Until better data is compiled concerning the entire student body, it is difficult to justify the 
fact that athletes are measured on a different scale as far as graduation rates are concerned.  
Another problem is the incentive system to spend more by adding marginal programs to boost 
graduation rate performance. The larger schools’ ability to manipulate its aggregate GSR rate is par-
ticularly problematic because the increased spending is often times not offset by an equal percentage 
of revenue generating activities. In a private business, these incentives do not exist because the enti-
ties are not subsidized by various outside sources.  
While graduation rates and other indicators of academic progress have improved, much more needs 
to be done. The NCAA took a step in the right direction when it implemented the APR initiative to re-
form academic standards on a team by team basis. The ball was put in the individual teams’ court 
and they have responded with success, and GSRs are on the rise in the problematic sports, namely 
football and basketball, although the existence of clustering and other practices raises the issue of 
the true extent of improvement. It is imperative that the NCAA continue to enforce its rules amid 
pressure from poor performing schools. While a 60 percent GSR is an improvement for some teams, 
the low rate still warrants more action on the part of coaches, administrators, and the NCAA. 
Part III – Revenues 
Athletic programs are often thought of as “profit-centers” generating revenue that helps subsidize 
other university budgets.  However, the data largely do not support this thesis, with only 19 athletic 
programs in the country realizing positive net generated revenue during fiscal year 2006.46  Further-
more, of those 19, the median net generated revenue was only $4.3 million.  The remaining 100 FBS 
programs had negative median revenue on the order of $8.9 million.47 What’s more, a 2007 study by 
Laura Frieder and Daniel Fulks examining the effects on schools moving up divisions in the NCAA 
concluded, “there are neither obvious financial nor considerable nonfinancial measurable benefits 
from reclassification and that the primary motivation to reclassify is intangible” (e.g., increased per-
ceived prestige).48 Indeed net losses for schools moving up divisions increased on average.49 While it 
is possible that athletics bring intangible benefits, and as many argue increased donations, it seems 
clear that for most institutions an athletics program is a financial cost item. Moreover, the definition 
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of revenues and costs is subject to criticism, and one can argue the fiscal drain in often greater than 
the official data indicate. 
Men’s sports, especially in the major sports of football and basketball, are indeed profitable. In fact, 
in 2006, 51 percent of all men’s programs reported profits from operations. However, zero percent of 
female programs profited.50 When taken as an aggregate, expenses exceed revenues at all but a hand-
ful of FBS institutions.  
As noted earlier, there are huge disparities in the revenues of intercollegiate athletics programs. Fig-
ure 3 shows the net revenues for the 19 profiting FBS institutions in 2006 and Figure 4 shows the 
net revenues for the remaining 100 institutions losing money from athletics in 2006. While the dis-
parities between these two groups are striking, the variations among schools in each category are as-
tounding as well. While the variation in profits in the 90 percent of institutions below the top revenue 
generating schools is only slightly more than $17 million, the range within the top 10 percent was an 
astronomical $139.4 million. (It should be noted that the gift to Oklahoma State athletics by T. Boone 
Pickens in 2006 is likely responsible for much of this wide disparity at the top). This shows that with 
the exception of a very few schools, athletics are not a large revenue generator. While a few schools 
profit, most are losing money. With the prospect of net revenues over $150 million in a year, it is 
hardly surprising that schools continue to yearn to produce top performing athletic teams. However, 
Figure 3: Total Net Revenue, All Profiting FBS Institutions, 2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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as evidenced by the data, risks are quite high and success rates are quite low. Playing intercollegiate 
sports is a bit like playing the lottery –most lose money, but sometimes a school gets a nice payoff. 
Figure 4 represents the 100 institutions with negative net revenue from athletics in 2006. While the 
variation is still large, it is somewhat less dramatic than that shown in Figure 3 for the 19 profiting 
institutions. Yet, the range is still $26.6 million .This indicates that a few schools lost extraordinarily 
large amounts to athletics, and suggests that losses for the average institution were much more mod-
est. Indeed, the median losses for schools falling in the 51-60 percentile range was between -$8.9 
million and -$7.26 million. Roughly, the typical loss was $8 million annually –using accounting 
methods than tend to understate true losses. Despite the wide disparities within categories, probably 
the most interesting point is that for 84 percent of all FBS institutions, athletics is a revenue bust, 
and sometimes a big one. 
Revenue Growth 
Athletic revenues grew significantly over the three year period of 2004-2006. Figure 5 shows that to-
tal median revenue at FBS schools increased from around $30.1 million in 2004 to $35.4 million in 
2006—a growth of 17.6 percent.  
Figure 4: Total Net Revenue, All FBS Institutions with Negative Net Revenue, 
2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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Figure 5: Growth of Median Total Revenues, All FBS Institutions, 2004-06 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Figure 6: Growth Rates of Generated & Allocated Revenue, all FBS Institutions, 
2004-06 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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This figure must be qualified however. Revenues are reported in two broad categories: generated and 
allocated. Generated revenues are those produced specifically by the athletic department and include 
things such as “ticket sales, radio and television receipts, alumni contributions, guarantees and 
other revenue sources that are not dependent upon entities outside of the athletics department.”51 
Allocated revenues are those earmarked to the department from the larger institutional budget or 
from government earmarks specifically to athletics. Although both types grew over this period, allo-
cated revenues grew at a much faster rate. Figure 6 shows that while generated revenues did in-
crease by 8.3 percent, allocated revenues grew by much more at 57.1 percent.   
An institution’s generation of new athletic income was much more modest. In both total dollars and 
as a percentage, allocated revenue growth outpaced the growth in generated revenue. In fact, 61 per-
cent of the overall real growth is explained by allocated revenue—i.e. schools simply appropriating 
more money to athletics. When considering this figure, revenue growth rates between 2004 and 2006 
are less impressive. 
Figure 7 shows median allocated revenues for the years 2004-2006 at all FBS institutions.  While the 
revenues of the athletic department have increased, more than half of the total growth has been at 
the expense of the institution. 
  Figure 8 shows that in 2006 allocated revenues made-up slightly more than a quarter of total ath-
letic department revenue. This suggests that most programs are not self-supporting. Rather than be-
ing revenue-generating profit centers for the university, most big-time athletic programs actually in-
creasingly divert university funds. Athletic budgets are becoming more dependent on institutional re-
sources. 
Figure 7: Allocated Revenue by Year, All FBS Institutions, 2004-2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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Figure 8: Generated vs. Non-Generated Revenues, Median FBS Institution, 
2006  
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Figure 9: Median Allocated Revenue Sources, All FBS Institutions, 2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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It is interesting to examine the source of allocated funding to athletic programs. Allocated revenues 
include: student fees allocated directly to athletics, direct institutional support (financial transfers 
directly to athletics from the general fund), indirect institutional support (such as the payment of 
utilities, maintenance, support salaries, etc), and direct government support from state or local gov-
ernments.52 Figure 9 shows student fees and direct institutional support as two major sources of to-
tal allocated revenue. Student fees account for more than $1.4 million and direct institutional aid 
more than $2.1 million. Dividing student fee allocations by the average undergraduate enrollment of 
17,476 for all FBS institutions in 2006 students gives a value of $81.13—meaning students were 
paying an average of $81.13 directly to athletics.  
As figure 10 indicates, athletic budgets consist of several different line items. Ticket sales and cash/
alumni contributions are by far the largest revenue generators, making up 50 percent of total median 
generated revenue for all FBS institutions.53 NCAA and conference distributions account for another 
18 percent and royalties/advertising/sponsorship around 5 percent. Many of these categories surely 
vary widely by institution and athletic conference. Big time programs certainly sell more tickets, 
make more money from merchandise sales to fans, have larger television and radio contracts, etc. 
Furthermore, NCAA distributions are given to conferences based on a number of factors, including 
Figure 10: Total Generated Median Revenue by Source, Average FBS Institu-
tion, 2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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the number of sports sponsored and post-season participation over a six-year rolling period. Thus, 
schools with larger athletic programs and more successful teams can expect greater revenues. 
These revenue line items shed light on the incentive structures facing athletic programs. With ticket 
sales accounting for more than $7.4 million annually in revenue at a typical school, schools work 
hard to augment this figure. The incentive is to build larger stadiums, host more home games and 
spend money in attempts to produce winning teams that fans will pay money to come watch. How-
ever, as Ryan Miller points out, increasing the season length has the negative effect of also increasing 
the amount of time student-athletes are away from the classroom.54 There is a trade-off between 
meeting academic values and athletic objectives, and athletics often wins. Additionally, increasing the 
number of home games usually also means increasing the number of away matches. This imposes 
new travel costs, which can be substantial. 
Donations 
Perhaps the most interesting of the generated revenue line items are “cash contributions from alumni 
and others.” Not only is this category large—about 22 percent of total generated revenues, but it is 
also possible that donations to athletic departments impose an opportunity cost by distracting dona-
tions that may have otherwise been made to academic dimensions of a school. The most extravagant 
example is T. Boone Pickens’ gift of $165 million in 2006 to Oklahoma State University athletics—the 
largest single athletics gift to a U.S. university in history.55 While this gift could possibly transform 
Cowboy athletics, it may have been of more direct benefit to the academic mission of the university if 
the gift were unrestricted in nature.56 It is plausible that such gifts, or at least a portion of them, may 
have been given to academics if athletics did not exist. In this sense athletic donations may induce 
the “crowding-out effect” by competing with the overall institution for scarce donations. 
On the other side of the debate however, many argue that athletics create a sense of school spirit and 
loyalty which leads to increased donations to the academic side of a school, not just the athletics de-
partment. In this case, it could be that even if the vast majority of athletic programs run a budgetary 
deficit, they may still be worth the investment as they augment the overall revenue to the university 
through increased donations. 
A number of studies have attempted to address these questions. A 1990 study by Robert E. McCor-
mick and Maurice Tinsley found that, “A 10 percent increase per alumnus in donations to the ath-
letic booster club is associated with a 5.0 percent increase in donations to the alumni fund.”57  This 
builds on their 1987 study claiming that athletic programs, and especially successful athletic pro-
grams, offer cheap advertising that attracts more student applications. With a wider pool of appli-
cants the institution can be more selective, and thus realize a higher quality student body.58 The con-
clusion to be drawn from the two studies is that “the elimination of athletics and athletic fundraising 
could have deleterious effects on both academic contributions and academic standards.”59 
A third study, by Grimes and Chressanthis, found a significantly positive correlation between athletic 
success at Mississippi State University and overall contributions to that institution. This includes a 
spill-over into increased academic contributions.60 These three studies seem to refute the notion that 
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Figure 11: Percentage of Contributions Given to Athletics, FBS Institutions, 
1998-2003  
Source: Jeffrey L. Stinson. “The Effects of Intercollegiate Athletics Success…” 
Figure 12: Percent Growth in Contributions by Type, FBS Institutions, 1998-
2003 
Source: Jeffrey L. Stinson. “The Effects of Intercollegiate Athletics Success…” 
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athletic donations impose a crowding-out effect on academic contributions. Indeed, these suggest the 
opposite to be the case, with athletic and academic contributions sharing a symbiotic relationship. 
However, more recent data suggests these findings may be invalid. According to Jeffrey Stinson, re-
porting figures from the Council for Aid to Education, the percentage of donations being given to ath-
letics (compared with academics) increased dramatically between 1998 and 2003. Figure 11 shows 
that on average for all FBS institutions in 1998, around 15 percent of alumni donations and 12 per-
cent of non-alumni donations were given specifically to athletics. By 2003 those same figures were 26 
percent and 18.5 percent. Furthermore, as shown in figure 12, at a growth rate of nearly 129 per-
cent, athletic contributions accounted for a disproportionate amount of the growth in total contribu-
tions. All this evidence suggests that athletics have been capturing a larger proportion of total contri-
butions that may have otherwise gone to academics. This seems to support the claim that athletics 
crowd out academic fundraising. 
Essentially, successful teams are more crucial to obtaining donation dollars for athletics at schools 
where a strong academic tradition is less firmly established. At Tier 1 (US News and World Report 
rankings) schools, the percentage of contributions going to athletics was smaller than at lower 
ranked academic institutions. Stinson concludes that “Total giving to schools with the strongest aca-
demic reputations was less susceptible to the changing fortunes of athletic teams…than total giving 
to institutions not included in the top tier of academically ranked schools.”61 Yet, institutions at all 
levels demonstrated an increasing proportion of donations being given to athletics compared with 
academics between 1998 and 2003.62 This supports the hypothesis that athletics is capturing re-
sources that may have gone to academic functions and in turn may be crowding out donations.  
It is difficult to assess the overall contribution of athletics to total fundraising efforts for a university. 
In terms of the affect of athletic success upon donations, Stinson does conclude that athletic success 
variables were significant in explaining athletic giving patterns but not academic giving.63 While a 
school’s athletic success does not seem to matter to academic giving, it could still be that the mere 
existence of an athletics program helps attract more donations. It is important that university admin-
istrators thoughtfully consider the costs and benefits of supporting athletics before making such 
budgetary decisions. 
How about the argument of McCormick, Tinsley and others stating that athletics, and especially suc-
cessful athletics, help advertise an institution, bringing in more applications? Increased applications 
allow an institution to either increase the size of its student body or be more selective in admissions. 
Increased selectivity provides for a more qualified entering student body and a more academically 
qualified institution. However, one must question the use of athletics to simply attract more qualified 
students to a school. Rather than spending resources to attract better inputs, it may be more pru-
dent for a university to focus on boosting its educational product and providing better outputs. 
School X may subsidize intercollegiate athletics $10 million a year, and that subsidy yields 200 more 
applicants, but the money spent on improving the academic product, marketing efforts, etc., might 
have a larger positive application effect.  
If athletics does indeed boost applications, it is being used to compete more favorably with other in-
stitutions for more of the limited quality students. Attracting better inputs allows a school to appear 
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Figure 13: Median Net Revenue by Men’s Sport, FBS Institutions, 2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Figure 14: Median Net Revenue by Women’s Sport, FBS Institutions, 2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
 Matthew Denhart, Robert Villwock and Richard Vedder 
 27 
Figure 15: Total Net Football Revenue, All Profiting FBS Football Programs, 
2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Figure 16: Total Net Football Revenue, All FBS Programs Losing Money, 2006 
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Figure 17: Total Net Men’s Basketball Revenue, All Profiting FBS Programs, 
2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Figure 18: Total Net Men’s Basketball Revenue, All FBS Programs Losing 
Money, 2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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superior; however outputs are what truly count when measuring the effectiveness of education. 
Rather than investing heavily in athletics which only marginally, if at all, improve educational out-
puts for the average student, perhaps schools would be more wise to invest in academic functions 
that will have a more direct and positive impact for the average student. This is not to say that uni-
versities should necessarily cut all athletic subsidies to zero; however a careful analysis of the costs 
and benefits of spending such large amounts seems warranted.  
 Revenues by Sport 
While men’s football and basketball are big revenue sports, all others realize negative net revenues. 
Figures 13 and 14 show the median net revenues for all sponsored men’s and women’s sports at FBS 
institutions in 2006. A considerable portion of men’s football and basketball programs actually real-
ize a profit from operations. In 2006, 56 percent of football programs and 57 percent of men’s basket-
ball programs had revenues that exceeded expense. However, all other sports consistently have ex-
penses that exceed revenues and therefore need to be subsidized. Women’s basketball is the most 
costly, with a median loss of more than $1.25 million in 2006.64 A profit maximizing corporation 
would eliminate all sports beside football and men’s basketball as they do not generate profits. How-
ever, universities are not profit maximizing entities, and NCAA stipulations require an institution to 
support a minimum of 14 sports in order to maintain its Division I status. Additionally, Title IX regu-
lations require schools to sponsor women’s athletic programs. With these stipulations, if schools were 
purely profit-maximizing, most would cut athletics entirely. Since only 19 of the 119 programs prof-
ited in 2006, it simply would not make sense to support them in most cases.   
While football and men’s basketball are revenue generators for a majority of schools, there are still 
wide disparities between institutions within these two sports. Figure 15 shows total net football reve-
nue for those FBS institutions profiting in 2006. Schools ranged from just barely breaking even on 
football to generating over $43 million in profit. The disparity even within the top 10 percent highest 
profiting institutions is large with a difference of $13 million between the upper and lower bound 
schools. Figure 16 shows that the losses from football are much smaller than the possible payouts. 
The school losing the most money from football in 2006 lost slightly less than $7.8 million compared 
to the payout of $43 million for the school profiting the most from football. Figures 17 and 18 show 
similar findings for men’s basketball—although on a smaller scale. 
Summary 
Athletics are a losing proposition as revenue generators for most FBS institutions. Indeed, only 19 of 
119 institutions realized positive net generated revenue in 2006. The other 100 relied upon allocated 
funds from the wider university budget to subsidize operations and balance athletic budgets. While 
total revenues grew over the period from 2004 to 2006, much of this growth was due to increased al-
location from the wider university budget. In fact, in 2006 allocated funds accounted for nearly a 
quarter of median total revenues. Ticket sales, donations and NCAA/conference distributions ac-
counted for most generated revenue. Thus, schools with successful teams with large fan bases were 
the schools profiting from athletics.  
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 While numerous studies from the late 1980s and early 1990s suggested that the net externalities 
from athletics on donations to the wider university were positive, newer research suggests the oppo-
site may be the case. Increasingly athletic giving is taking a greater share of total donations to a uni-
versity. While athletic success appears to significantly impact giving to a school’s athletic department, 
it does not show a positive relationship to academic giving. It is possible that athletics may be impos-
ing a crowding-out effect to a certain degree on donations that may have gone to traditional academic 
missions of the university were athletics not to exist. Weisbrod, et al briefly mention this as one pos-
sible systematic shortcoming of calculating the profitability of athletics. They cite donations as a 
prime example of revenue that may have still gone to the university were athletics to not exist.65  
With such high potential payouts from athletics—the highest profiting institution brought in $156.5 
million in 2006—it is no wonder schools strive to build their fan base and put winning teams on the 
field. Yet, there is a great cost associated with this risky investment. 
Part IV - Expenses 
 In 2006 the median total expenses for all FBS institutions were over $35.75 million. Additionally, the 
average expenditure per athlete was reported as $65,800. Just as growth was observed in revenues 
between 2004 and 2006, there too was growth in athletic expenses over this time period.  
Disparities in Athletic Expenditures 
Figure 19: Median Total Operating Expenditures by Quartile, FBS Institutions, 
2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
 Matthew Denhart, Robert Villwock and Richard Vedder 
 31 
Figure 20: Median Total Expenses by Sport, FBS Institutions, 2006  
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Figure 21: Average Athletic Expenditures per Male & Female Athlete, FBS In-
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As with revenues, there are wide disparities in terms of expenditures for athletics among FBS institu-
tions. Figure 19 breaks down median total operating expenditures for all FBS institutions by quartile. 
Spending in 2006 ranged from a median of just less than $16.7 million at the bottom quarter of 
schools to around $63.25 million at the top quarter. Certainly the profitability of a school’s athletic 
program helps explain much of the variation in total expenses. Those programs able to cover their 
costs would logically be more likely to spend greater amounts. 
Expenditures by sport vary widely as well with football and basketball again falling at the top of the 
list. In 2006 the median spending on football exceeded $8.5 million and men’s and women’s basket-
ball combined to total median spending in excess of $4.5 million (as shown in figure 20). Several 
other sports are surprisingly expensive. Of the non-major sports, ice hockey is the most expensive 
with median spending at $2.6 million. Yet several smaller sports are devoted much fewer resources. 
In fact, football expenditures exceed the sum of median expenses for the bottom 14 sports listed in 
figure 20. 
It should not come as a surprise that schools invest more heavily in the major sports of football and 
basketball. As we saw from the previous section, football and men’s basketball are the only two 
sports that annually produce generated revenue in excess of expenses. Furthermore, the prospects 
for big payouts present themselves in these two sports through participation and victories in major 
bowls and the annual NCCA men’s basketball tournament. These sports are also by far the most visi-
ble nationally. Thus, it is rational to support the football team more heavily than the rifle squad if the 
objective is to promote the university on a national stage.  
 It is interesting to examine athletic expenses by gender. Figure 21 shows total athletic expenditures 
per male and female athlete from 2004 to 2006. Although athletic expenditure growth between 2004 
and 2006 was divided fairly evenly between male and female athletes, the disparity between overall 
spending per athlete still heavily favors male athletes. Over this timeframe, real expenditures per 
male athlete climbed from $46,958 to $52,000, a growth of 10.7 percent. Spending per female athlete 
nearly kept pace at 10.0 percent, but despite this, growth expenditures were $27,000 in 2006—a fig-
ure $25,000 less than for men. Football likely contributes a good deal to this disparity.  
Expenditure Growth 
Figure 22 highlights the contrast between the spending for athletics at FBS institutions and those 
programs not competing at the top levels nationally. Median expenses in 2006 were 2.8 times greater 
at FBS institutions than FCS (football “championship”) institutions. Second, it shows the overall 
scope of spending for athletics is quite large. Finally, it is evident that real expenses grew signifi-
cantly, from slightly less than $31 million in 2004 to $35.75 million in 2006—a growth of 15.6 per-
cent at FBS schools. 
 We saw earlier that total real revenue growth for FBS institutions over this same period was around 
17.6 percent.  One must keep in mind that the growth in generated revenue was much more modest 
at 8.3 percent. Thus, the 15.6 percent growth in expenditures signals that nationwide between 2004 
and 2006 athletics at FBS institutions became more of a financial burden and required more institu-
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Figure 22: Median Total Expenditures by NCAA Classification, 2004-2006 
Figure 23: Generated Revenue vs. Total Expenses, FBS Institutions, 2004-06 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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tional resources. Figure 23 juxtaposes median total generated revenues and median total expenses to 
highlight this. 
Expenditure Line Items 
Figure 24 displays the median spending by individual line items for FBS institutions in 2006. Two 
categories, salaries/benefits and athletic grants/scholarships, combine to account for 48 percent of 
total expenditures.66 “Other” expenditures are the third largest category at $2.87 million and 8 per-
cent of total spending. Dr. Daniel Fulks, chief architect of the annual NCAA voluntary survey of inter-
collegiate athletics finances, assures us that he has made it a priority  
to have “other” spending better defined by schools and that the figure reported for 2006 is less than 
in previous years.67 This is a welcome development and should be encouraged in the future as a way 
to bring more transparency to athletic spending. 
Among coach/administrative salaries and athlete grants, it is surprising that the salaries nearly dou-
ble the cost of scholarships for athletes. The athletes are the ones who attract the large crowds, gen-
erate the revenue and are the ones for whom athletics supposedly exist to benefit. Yet, it appears ath-
letic coaches and other athletic officials may be profiting considerably.  
Figure 24: Total Median Operating Expenses by Object of Expenditure, FBS In-
stitutions, 2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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Indeed there is a growing debate on the issue of student-athlete compensation. Athletes in the major 
sports of football and men’s basketball generate huge revenues for the athletics department. How-
ever, compensation levels (essentially tuition, fees, room, board and books) are wildly below the mar-
ket value the athlete would command in a competitive market, which is determined by the marginal 
revenue the employee contributes to the business enterprise. A recent Wall Street Journal article 
highlights this with examples of student-athletes who left college early to compete professionally.68 
Kevin Durant left the University of Texas after a stellar freshman season and signed a contract worth 
$3.5 million to go along with endorsements with companies like Nike and Gatorade. Heisman Trophy 
winner Reggie Bush opted out of his senior season with the University of Southern California and 
signed a deal with the New Orleans Saints guaranteeing $26.3 million over six years. In both of these 
cases, compensation paid by the athlete’s respective school was only around 1 percent of his next 
year compensation as a professional athlete.  A good case can be made that major college athletes are 
some of the most exploited labor in America today. 
Top level football and basketball coaches at FBS schools typically earn several times the salary of the 
university president, and the era of million dollar top assistant coaches has arrived.69 Since a large 
part of the success of coaches arises from their ability to recruit good players, it can be argued that a 
large portion of their salary reflects their capturing some of the economic exploitation of their more 
talented recruits. This raises ethical and moral as well as economic issues. 
Facilities maintenance and rental comprises another 7.2 percent of spending. This does not include 
capital expenditures on new facilities and stadiums. Such spending is supposed to be recorded as 
athletic department debt service, yet these figures are not readily available. A 2001 report by the 
Knight Commission makes the case that an athletics arms race is under way. The report cites a rise 
in capital expenditures for facilities of 250 percent in the seven years leading up to 2001.70 The Com-
mission points out that institutions often conclude that joining the arms race is a necessity to remain 
competitive with other programs. This spending is justified as providing positive externalities such as 
increased donations, applications, etc. Yet, as we have seen, very few programs generate revenues 
and even these other ostensible benefits do not hold-up to empirical scrutiny as well as university 
officials would have the public believe. The Commission argues that the “Pursuit of success in this 
context jeopardizes not only the universities’ moral heritage but also their financial security.”71   
Team travel costs the athletics department almost $2.5 million per year. It is interesting that this cost 
exceeds actual game expenses. This suggests that it is more expensive to get to a competition than to 
actually host it. It is not uncommon for a team from the East coast to fly out to California to compete 
in a non-conference match-up, or vice versa. Additionally, tournaments are often held in exotic, and 
hard to reach, locales. A sampling of this year’s (2008-09 season) preseason men’s basketball tourna-
ments revealed that they were being held in destinations such as Maui, the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
Puerto Rico and Cancun, Mexico.  Not only is the cost of transporting a team across the entire coun-
try costly, but such long trips require multiple nights of costly lodging. One of the NCAA’s newest 
postseason football bowl games, The International Bowl, is held in Toronto, Canada. Recently passed 
immigration requirements mandate passports to travel between the two countries, meaning athletic 
departments now have to purchase passports for players and coaches just to attend the game. Mini-
mizing games played at great distances from home would be an easy way to reduce these costs. 
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It is also not uncommon for sports teams to stay in hotels the evening before a home match. A No-
vember 2008 article reports that within the Western Athletic Conference (WAC), Boise State is the 
only football team to not stay in a hotel the night before home games.72 Putting a stop to practices 
like this is another small possible step to reduce the cost of athletics.  
The next most expensive line item is fundraising at $953,000. You will recall that cash contribu-
tions/donations are the second largest revenue generator for athletics at around $5.8 million annu-
ally. It is not surprising that institutions would invest in development efforts to maximize donations.  
In effect, this expense imposes a 16.4 percent tax on all donations to run the advancement wing of 
the athletics department.  Equipment/supplies, guarantees and options, recruiting and medical 
costs, spirit groups and membership dues combine to account for the remaining 9 percent of total 
median athletic expenditures. 
These line items shed much light on the nature of athletic expenditures. Given the especially large 
magnitude of salaries and grants-in-aid, we will next turn our attention to a more close examination 
of these two expense items. 
Athletic Related Salaries 
It is common to hear complaints about the enormous salaries of head athletic coaches. These accusa-
tions are not without merit. Data compiled by USA Today show that 48 head football coaches in 2006
-07 at FBS institutions reporting salary data earned in excess of $1 million (not including perform-
ance bonuses existing at most schools). Football coaches at 69 FBS schools earned more during that 
same year than the president of their institution.74 This statistic is particularly alarming at a number 
of schools. For example, at the University of Iowa, head football coach Kirk Ferentz had total earnings 
of $3.03 million, while the university’s president only made $324,050. At Oklahoma, Coach Bob 
Stoops made slightly less than 9 times that of the university’s president, and at Tennessee, Coach 
Phillip Fulmer earned 6.4 times more than the schools president in 2006-07.  
These figures seem counter-intuitive since it is the university president that is ultimately responsible 
to students, taxpayers and state legislatures (at public institutions). Within the larger organizational 
structure, the position of football coach is similar to that of a department chair. The football team is 
but one wing of the athletics department, just as say the theater department is one wing of the fine 
arts college. It would be unusual for the chair of the theater department to be paid more than the 
dean of the college, much less the university president. Yet, that is the scenario observed with respect 
to football (and indeed some basketball coaches) at the majority of FBS schools. 
While compensating a mid-level manager more than his/her superiors may indeed seem counter-
intuitive, the phenomenon can be explained by institutional priorities and simple economics. The 
fierce competition between schools for top coaches demonstrates a relatively high demand and low 
supply of desirable coaches.  When the demand is especially high, because the school places an espe-
cially large priority on sports, the salary a coach is able to command can be well beyond the salary of 
that coach’s bosses. Ultimately, market forces show that our competitive colleges value top athletic 
teams highly. It is the job of the boards of trustees to provide some oversight and determine if they 
are in agreement with this prioritization and allocation of resources. 
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Figure 25: Median Salary Expenses for All Men’s Coaches by Sport, FBS Institu-
Figure 26: Median Salary Expenses for All Women’s Coaches by Sport, FBS In-
stitutions, 2006 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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Figure 27: Median Total Salary Outlays by Position, FBS Institutions, 2006  
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
Figure 28: Annual Average Cost of Full In-State Grant in Aid, Public FBS Insti-
tutions, 2004-06 
Source: Daniel Fulks, “2004-2006 NCAA Revenues and Expenses…” 
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The extraordinarily high salaries are concentrated in a few sports. Men’s football, basketball, ice 
hockey and women’s basketball are the only sports with median salaries greater than $200,000 per 
year. These sports—with the exception of hockey—are the greatest generators of revenue. The correla-
tion between median head coach salary by men’s sport and median generated revenue by sport is 
strong and positive at 0.95. This suggests that colleges invest most heavily in head coaches for those 
sports that generate large amounts of revenue. When looking at the correlation between a sport’s 
head coach salary and that sport’s GSR (graduation success rate), the correlation is negative at -0.63. 
Such a figure suggests that schools value coaches for generating revenue, not for graduating their stu-
dent-athletes. Weisbrod, et al illuminate this point by examining the incentives designed into con-
tracts for a sample of football and basketball coaches. They find that the incentives for winning con-
tests greatly outweigh those for the academic success of student athletes. In the case of Auburn Uni-
versity, potential athletic based incentives outpace academic incentives by a ratio of 37:1.75 
Figures 25 and 26 show the median salaries for all coaches (head coaches and assistants) for men’s 
and women’s sports in 2006. We observe wide disparities in the figures. Football coaches earned a 
median salary close to $2.4 million, men’s basketball coaches just under $1 million and women’s 
basketball coaches slightly less than $500,000.  
Salaries are by far the largest athletic related expense. While much of this pays for coaches, a sur-
prisingly large amount is spent on the salaries of administrators. Figure 27 shows median total sal-
ary outlays to assistant and head coaches as well as administrators. The fact that the median total 
outlays for athletic administrators exceed $4.7 million indicates that a sizeable bureaucracy supports 
athletics. Administrative salaries account for an estimated 13.2 percent of total athletic operating ex-
penditures. Indeed outlays for administrators alone are nearly as large as those for athlete scholar-
ships. Shaving this bureaucracy could be a significant way to reduce costs. 
Grants-in-Aid 
Scholarships to athletes were first introduced in the 1930s and were widespread by the 1950s.76 In 
2006 grants-in-aid were the second largest expenditure item for a school’s athletic budget at around 
$5.8 million. This figure has grown rapidly. In 2004, the annual average real cost of a full in-state 
grant was $16,115. Only 2 years later, in 2006, that same figure had increased 22.2 percent to 
$19,700 as is shown in figure 28. The costs are even larger for out-of-state student athletes and also 
for athletes attending private institutions. Out-of-state grants increased 15.5 percent to slightly more 
than $29,000, and the average cost for grants at private schools rose 5.1 percent to $39,600 in 2006.    
The growth in tuition and room/board explains much of this increase. Between 1976 and 2006, the 
compounded real annual rate of growth was 2.4 percent, meaning costs rose from $9,130 in 1976 to 
$18,445 in 2006. In the wake of the recent economic downturn, institutions will be forced to place a 
greater scrutiny on all expenses to determine which can be eliminated and how each relates to the 
fundamental mission of the school.  Athletics may be one area to see cutbacks.   
Summary 
Intercollegiate athletics is a big business and the expenses to sponsor them are significant. Median 
total expenses at FBS schools in 2006 were around $35.75 million and median expenditures per ath-
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lete were $65,800.  Spending is concentrated largely in the sports of football, basketball, and to a 
lesser extent, ice hockey. Spending on male athletes was nearly double that of their female counter-
parts in 2006.  
Expenditure growth has not been encouraging. Over the short period from 2004 to 2006, total me-
dian athletic expenditures increased 15.6 percent and median expenditures per athlete rose 13.75 
percent. With generated revenue growing only 8.3 percent over the same period, it is clear that costs 
are rising faster than new revenues for athletics. Thus, athletics has become more of a burden on in-
stitutional resources over this period. 
Salaries for coaches and administrators, athlete grants, maintenance, and rent on facilities and travel 
costs are notably large. Salaries for top football coaches have, in many cases, reached extraordinary 
levels. Of those schools where data is available, 69 head football coaches at FBS institutions earned 
more during the 2006-07 year than that university’s president. Beyond high salaries paid to coaches, 
it seems that athletics departments are typically run by large bureaucracies, with median outlays to 
administrators around $4.7 million annually.   Clearly, an athletic arms race is well under way. 
Expenses have grown wildly, and top coaches are commanding record salaries as schools continue to 
pour money into athletics. This spiraling spending does little to make school “A” more competitive 
with school “B” because on balance, for every winner there must be a loser. To bring costs under con-
trol, real reform is needed. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Intercollegiate athletics have many positive benefits. Among many things, sport competitions can cre-
ate a sense of school spirit and solidarity that extends beyond the immediate campus to help connect 
far-flung alumni back to their alma mater. Furthermore, athletics benefits the student-athletes them-
selves. They provide an opportunity for athletically gifted students to pursue their greatest passion 
while helping to instill important values. Among many things, athletics helps teach responsibility, 
leadership, competitiveness, sportsmanship, teamwork, cooperation and time-management skills. All 
of these things contribute to more productive workers upon graduation, advancing society. Beyond 
that, college sports are a staple of American culture and are a wildly popular form of entertainment.  
Lots of college students attend universities or small colleges where there is little in the way of serious 
intercollegiate athletic competition or where such competition is relatively low key and fairly inexpen-
sive to offer. Some of the nation’s top schools have very modest or no intercollegiate athletic competi-
tion (schools like the University of Chicago, M.I.T., and Cal Tech come immediately to mind).  
Yet it seems that at many of America’s largest colleges and universities, athletics has become over-
emphasized at great financial, academic and, arguably, moral costs. The fundamental mission of any 
university should be to advance the knowledge of its students and society through instruction and 
research. Athletics are often a distraction, both to the athletes themselves and the wider institution 
in meeting these primary goals. While graduation rate data are still somewhat murky, the low 
graduation rates among athletics, particularly in sports like football and basketball, is alarming, al-
though there is strong evidence that this problem  is endemic to the entire academic enterprise. The 
introduction of the Academic Progress Reform (APR) by the NCAA is a positive development that ap-
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pears to be helping to provide an incentive for coaches and athletes to take academics a bit more se-
riously. However, there have also been reports of athletes ‘clustering’ in certain academic majors that 
are less strenuous in order to meet these new standards. If it is the case that certain athletes can 
only remain eligible for competition by pursuing meaningless academic endeavors, our universities 
need to reexamine their priorities before granting them admission to an institution of higher educa-
tion. By admitting sub-standard students, universities compromise their academic integrity and have 
negative spillover effects on the academic mission. 
While the major sports of basketball and football have poorer graduation rates, athletes in many mi-
nor sports generally perform much better in the classroom. It appears that smaller sports enhance 
the athletic department’s overall graduation rate performance. This creates the incentive to add a 
greater number of smaller sports even though they are may not be a financially sound investment. 
Overall, on Myles Brand’s watch, the NCAA has taken some concrete steps to ensure that athletes 
remain students first. Enforcement of these policies and continued vigilance is necessary in this area. 
For virtually all colleges, intercollegiate athletics is not a good financial investment. In 2006, only 19 
of 119 FBS institutions realized a net profit from athletics, using a liberal definition of the term 
“profit.” As an average for the entire period from 2004 to 2006, only 16 broke even. Instead of making 
money, the evidence suggests that allocated revenue (largely coming from the wider university 
budget) has grown. By 2006, this allocated revenue accounted for more than a quarter of total ath-
letic revenues. Since expenditures per athlete have grown more rapidly than generated revenues, ath-
letics have become more of a burden, using up scarce university funds. When considering the oppor-
tunity cost of such funds, such as spending to build new classrooms, purchase new technologies, or 
hire quality faculty, this cost is considerable. 
Despite this, the current incentive structure encourages increased spending. The current prevailing 
wisdom is that spending increases athletic performance. So schools try to buy the best coaches, and 
spend a lot to buy the best facilities in order to recruit good athletes. In some aggregate sense, this is 
doomed to failure, since the average of all relevant teams wins 50 percent of its games – for every 
winner, there is a loser.  
Donations from alumni and others are the second highest revenue generator among FBS athletic pro-
grams. The effect of athletic success on donations has been the subject of several scholarly studies, 
and we would conclude that the evidence is inconclusive, with their perhaps impacting less distin-
guished academic institutions more than schools with an existing reputation for academic excellence. 
On the whole, the argument that successful athletics is necessary to maximize donations to academ-
ics appears somewhat dubious.  
With growing expenses in a time of budget shortfalls, reform of athletic expenses is needed. The sala-
ries of coaches and athletic administrators seem out of line with institutional priorities. In 2006, 48 
head football coaches made in excess of $1 million and 69 earned more than their university’s presi-
dent. Travel expenses are another large expense. Teams often have to charter flights and stay in ho-
tels for multiple nights to compete in games and tournaments in hard-to-reach locales. 
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Grants-in-aid are the number two expense for athletics. This expense has grown significantly as col-
lege tuition and room/board costs have soared. Over the 30 year period from 1976 to 2006, such 
costs have increased on average 2.4 percent compounded annually. This has been far greater than 
both the growth in inflation and personal incomes. It is clear that much reform is necessary beyond 
athletics to solve these problems. 
It is unlikely that universities and/or their athletics cartel, the NCAA are going to reform spending on 
their own, and given the popularity of college sports, political leaders are hesitant about forcing 
changes that might incur the wrath of sports fans. Yet, as financial pressures rise on schools, the 
ability to effect real reform is growing. What form might reform take? Below we outline a scenario that 
might be plausible and might work. 
Suppose the leaders of 25 to 30 universities, most of them with good athletic reputations as FBS 
schools and also with relatively high academic reputations, were to get together to call for a radical 
revision of college athletics. For example, what if schools like the University of Michigan, University of 
Illinois, University of North Carolina, University of Virginia, Duke University, Stanford University, 
University of Notre Dame, University of California (Berkeley), University of Washington, University of 
Texas, Northwestern University, Ohio State University, University of Southern California, Boston Col-
lege, University of Georgia, UCLA, University of Florida, Wake Forest, Vanderbilt, and the University 
of Wisconsin gathered, with the support of the eight presidents of the Ivy League schools (Harvard, 
Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Pennsylvania, Brown, Dartmouth and Cornell). These schools represent a 
significant portion of several major athletic conferences, including the Southeastern Conference, Big 
10, Pacific-10, Big 12, and Atlantic Coast Conference, as well as the entire Ivy League. 
Suppose these schools say they are going to: 
• Reduce the length of seasons, number of games, size of coaching staffs, and the number of per-
missible players in football and perhaps other sports; 
• Play at least 80 percent of their matches with other schools adhering to these reform principles; 
• Form at least two new conferences (seriously gutting five major existing conferences in the proc-
ess); 
• Outlaw redshirting and other practices that detract from emphasizing the primacy of academic 
matters even for athletes; 
• Prohibit play during examination periods; 
• Put limits on coaches salaries and put a limit on administrative staff size; 
• Insist that athletic departments be under the control of a university official such as the Provost; 
• Put strict limits on the size of institutional subsidy for the athletic programs; 
• Put academic officials in firm control of changes in conference/ national association  policies (or 
at least give them a veto power); 
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• Strictly limit post-season participation in bowl games, etc.  
It is an interesting issue whether the university presidents could pull this off and whether alums, leg-
islators, or others would try to derail the reforms, etc. On the other hand, seeing a large number of 
prestigious and also athletically proficient schools sign on might bring others along for the reforms – 
Penn State might follow the lead of Ohio State, for example, Texas A & M the lead of Texas, and Vir-
ginia Tech the lead of Virginia.  Obviously, the larger the initial group that agrees to the principles, 
the greater the probability the effort will succeed.  
Long before sports became as commercialized as they are now, huge crowds gathered to watch Har-
vard play Yale, Michigan play Ohio State, Army take on Navy, etc. School spirit can exist, entertain-
ment can be provided, and athletic programs can be at most a minor financial drain on institutions. 
An athletic disarmament conference might work, if dominated by academic types and not coaches, 
athletic directors, and fanatic alums. 
Short of that rather radical scenario, perhaps less far reaching reforms are possible.   Greater trans-
parency regarding intercollegiate athletics is certainly necessary.  A major problem is that financial 
data by institution is not readily available. Thus, there is not much accountability to the general pub-
lic. Publishing both total revenues and generated revenues would be a good first step, and this 
should be encouraged. 
Shorter seasons would likely benefit both athlete academic performance and help lower costs. De-
creasing travel distances likewise would reduce costs. As noted above, pre-season and post-season 
tournaments often require teams to travel across the country, and even internationally to compete. 
Realigning athletic conferences to be more regional is one possible reform. Between 2004 and 2005, 
the Atlantic Coastal Conference (ACC) expanded by adopting the University of Miami, Boston College, 
and Virginia Tech. It was hoped that such a move would garner higher revenues, especially through 
new football revenues. James Moeser, former chancellor of the University of North Carolina, re-
marked in 2008 that the league’s expansion “has not been an enormous benefit.”77 Yet, this move did 
greatly increase travel distances for conference teams. The driving distance between Boston and Mi-
ami is over 1,500 miles. While making the trip to compete in a football match may generate revenues, 
smaller sports teams also must travel, which further increases their losses. Making a concerted effort 
to maintain regionally based conferences should be a serious consideration. 
Renting out athletic facilities to private organizations when they are not in use is another cost-cutting 
suggestion. Alternatively, rather than building and maintaining expensive recreation and training fa-
cilities, universities could contract these services out to private businesses. 
Schools increasingly use student fees to subsidize athletics. Some argue that student fees are ad-
vance ticket sales and gym memberships. It is highly possible that a student may never attend, or 
desire to attend, an intercollegiate athletics contest. Yet, under such a scheme they are charged re-
gardless of their desire to consume. A market-based approach would be to allow students to opt-in 
for use of the recreation center and sport tickets, and then base allocations on demand for such ser-
vices.  
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In short, there are all sorts of possibilities for both modest and radical reforms. It will take joint ac-
tion among all or a sizable portion of major institutions to make reform possible. Perhaps banning 
athletic directors and coaches from the decision-making meetings of the NCAA would provide an at-
mosphere where academic and financial constraints will be given greater prominence.  However 
change occurs, it is needed to increase the financial viability of schools, reduce the downplaying of 
academic standards and values, and lower the culture of corruption and dishonesty that sometimes 
pervades college sports. 
An alternative reform approach relates to the distribution of income within athletics. A very good 
moral and economic case can be made that athletes in major revenue sports are severely exploited, 
and the formation of a national athletics union or some other mechanism might lead to paying play-
ers more, and perhaps coaches less. This type of reform, however, is quite different, and some ways 
contradictory, to the reforms aimed at reducing sports commercialization outlined above. This alter-
native approach involves accepting that college athletics is big business, and might lead to divorcing 
the athletic programs of universities from the academic mission completely, viewing players as up 
and coming professional performers gaining experience before trying to enter the big leagues of pro-
fessional sports. 
Either way, the current situation is not sustainable long-term. Cost and other pressures will require 
that universities rethink the role of intercollegiate athletics in the life of the academy. 
 




Regression Output: Athletic Success as a Factor in Explaining Starting Salary 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Starting Salary 
    
Method: Least Squares     
Sample: 1 302     
Included observations: 297     
Excluded observations: 5     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Mid West -2090.705  1043.263 -2.004005  0.0460 
North East -300.3813  971.4647 -0.309205  0.7574 
South East -2185.175  1031.563 -2.118315  0.0350 
West -1433.844  1038.041 -1.381297  0.1683 
Medium Enroll  2641.301  689.7565  3.829323  0.0002 
Large Enroll  2548.197  674.5656  3.777537  0.0002 
Religious  349.9240  656.2914  0.533184  0.5943 
Percent Pell  1.283136  18.70848  0.068586  0.9454 
Percent Women -322.7639  24.56969 -13.13667  0.0000 
Percent Black  109.9241  36.26842  3.030849  0.0027 
Percent Asian  197.2421  30.78115  6.407886  0.0000 
Percent Hispanic  40.68606  29.52154  1.378182  0.1693 
Percent Admitted -20.64906  12.38115 -1.667783  0.0965 
Percent Graduate  28.08339  16.17934  1.735756  0.0837 
Endowment per FTE  0.004887  0.001251  3.905671  0.0001 
Net Price  0.252419  0.050782  4.970666  0.0000 
Director’s Cup (no data = score of 0)  1.678630  0.844205  1.988415  0.0477 
Constant  55272.20  2305.505  23.97401  0.0000 
R-squared  0.732253     Mean de-
pendent var 
46549.49  
Adjusted R-squared  0.715939     S.D. depend-
ent var 
6645.274  
S.E. of regression  3541.757     Akaike info 
criterion 
19.24133  
Sum squared resid  3.50E+09     Schwarz cri-
terion 
19.46519  
Log likelihood -2839.337     F-statistic 44.88409  
Durbin-Watson stat  1.938513     Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.000000  
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